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How (and Why) NCLB Failed to Close the Achievement Gap:  Evidence from North 
Carolina, 1998-2004 
The twin goals of educational excellence and equity have inspired federal educational 
reforms since the middle of the last century thanks to Sputnik and Brown (1954). While there has 
been notable movement toward both goals, attaining educational equity and excellence has 
proven to be elusive. International comparisons indicate overall US student performance in 
science and mathematics is mediocre, lagging behind that of students in many advanced 
industrialized nations. Racial and socioeconomic gaps in educational performance and other 
outcomes persist despite decades of reforms designed to eliminate them. 
 
The political compromise that became No Child Left Behind (NCLB 2002) was designed 
to address both goals of excellence and equity but, as this article will show, there are reasons to 
believe it has achieved neither goal. The linchpin of this reform dynamic is high-stakes tests used 
to hold educators accountable. This article focuses on one aspect of this theory of reform in 
relation to the equity goal of NCLB—high-stakes tests and the gaps in achievement along the 
lines of race and socioeconomic status (SES). If NCLB is successful, the long-standing gaps in 
test scores between middle class and low-income youth, and among White, Black, Latino/a, 
Native American, and Asian students should shrink or disappear.  
 
In this article we present findings from our study of student achievement in North 
Carolina using standardized test score data from the state’s population of approximately 76,000 
high school seniors who graduated in 2004. Using test score data for each individual from 1998 
through 2004, along with indicators of family background, individual student factors, and school 
characteristics we show that testing and accountability did not eliminate achievement gaps. 
Moreover, we show that North Carolina’s standardized test scores actually contribute to the 
perpetuation of gaps in achievement because of (a) testing’s likely effects distorting curriculum 
and instruction and (b) the use of test scores to assign students to racially stratified tracks in core 
classes where students are exposed to very different curricula and have starkly different 
opportunities to learn. Black, Latino, Native American and low-income students are more likely 
to be assigned to lower tracks than their middle-class, White, and Asian counterparts. We argue 
that given the stratified nature of tracking, standardized tests used in conjunction with tracking 
and curricular distortions triggered by the pressure on educators to improve low-scoring 
students’ test performance (so-called ‘drill and kill’) contribute to the perpetuation of 
achievement gaps. It is through the quantifiable measurement of the interplay between high-
stakes testing and tracking that this paper makes an important contribution to the literature on 
education policy. 
 
The article proceeds as follows. We begin with a discussion of the theory of reform that 
underlies NCLB, contrasting its market-inspired principles with the equity-inspired reforms of 
the 1950s through 1980s. Next, we describe our North Carolina study that assesses whether 
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NCLB has narrowed achievement gaps in the state. We conclude the article with a discussion of 
the findings in light of the title’s claim that NCLB has failed to close achievement gaps, and we 
examine the implications of our findings for policy including the likely reauthorization of NCLB.  
 
 
 
NCLB and the Choice Theory of School Improvement 
 
The United States, unlike many European countries with centralized national control of 
educational policy, has no history of federal control of local schools. State and local control of 
public schools are a hallmark of the U.S. educational system, but the federal government became 
increasingly involved in public education during the second half of the 20
th
 century. Since then 
the federal courts, beginning with landmark decisions such as Brown (1954), pushed both the 
federal and state governments to remove race, disability, poverty, and gender barriers to 
educational opportunities. A number of presidents enforced judicial rulings and issued executive 
orders broadening educational access, most notably President Lyndon B. Johnson’s Executive 
Order 11246 (1965) that established the policy groundwork for affirmative action in higher 
education. In the 20
th
 century Congress passed sweeping education legislation, such as the GI 
Bill in 1945, the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Elementary and Secondary Education and Higher 
Education Acts of 1965, the 1972 amendment to the higher education act known as Title IX, and 
the Education for Children with Disabilities Act of 1975 (Public Law 94-142), reenacted in 1997 
as the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (Cross 2004, Manna 2006). Federal 
involvement in U.S. public education accelerated with the No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB 
2002). Passed as part of the 2001 reauthorization of the Elementary and Secondary Act and 
signed by President Bush in 2002, NCLB is one of the most comprehensive federal reforms 
governing state and local educational policies in U.S. history (NCLB, Section 1116 subsection 
115 STAT 1484).  
 
The current national educational reform movement, epitomized by NCLB, is a response 
to one of the core conservative critiques of public education, namely that it lacked standards and 
accountability. From the 1950s to the end of the 1980s, federal governmental efforts to reform 
education focused on equity-inspired legislation, policies, practices, and judicial decisions 
including school desegregation, Title IX (Heckman 1992), bilingual education (Troike 1978), 
compensatory education programs like Head Start (Garces, E., Thomas, D., and Currie, J. 2002), 
and Title I (Borman, Stringfield, and Slavin 2001). Beginning in the late 1980s during the 
George H.W. Bush administration, federal legislative and executive efforts turned to market 
principles such as choice, competition, standards, and accountability to achieve both goals 
(Petrovich and Wells 2005). The No Child Left Behind Act is emblematic of such market-
inspired federal school reform efforts. Its formal goals are to improve academic achievement 
while simultaneously advancing equality of educational opportunity and closing racial and 
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socioeconomic achievement gaps in outcomes. The law seeks to achieve these ends through 
market principles of choice, competition, standards, and accountability. Advocates of market-
inspired reforms argue that market dynamics will motivate principals and teachers to change 
their behaviors and improve educational efficiencies or go out of business because if they do not 
perform well, families will exercise their choice and move to schools that offer better options. 
Motivated to keep their jobs, teachers will improve and streamline their performance. 
Administrators will lead, inspire, and supervise by rewarding or sanctioning their staff 
accordingly. At the school level, administrators will hold teachers accountable for student 
outcomes and parents will hold them both accountable for their child’s and the school’s overall 
performance based largely on standardized test scores that ostensibly measure how well children 
have learned the formal curriculum standards set by the state. 
 
Although business leaders, governors, and other state actors began educational reforms 
three decades ago (Mickelson 1999), the contemporary alliance that dominates federal and state 
educational reform initiatives also includes several loosely related conservative advocacy groups, 
think tanks, philanthropies, and corporate reforms (Broad, Gates, and Walton—see Ravitch 
2010) that, while differing from each other in a number of respects, share a belief that education 
ought to be operating more as a market (including privatization, educational management 
organizations, vouchers, charters, and choice); that curricula, teaching, and achievement 
standards ought to be established; that systematic assessments ought to be used to determine if 
standards have been met; and that responsible parties (students, teachers, educators, schools, and 
ultimately the states) ought to be held accountable and sanctioned if standards are not met (Apple 
2001, Ehrenreich 1989, Smith and Miller-Kahn 2004). Another faction supporting standards-
based reforms includes Congressional Democrats, like Representative George Miller and the late 
Senator Edward Kennedy who both sponsored NCLB. These Congressional liberals were 
motivated by a different set of priorities from those of the conservative alliance. Their concerns 
lie more with the disparate outcomes of schooling by race, class, disability, and language, 
whereas conservatives tend to be motivated by concerns about enhancing efficiency and market 
principles, and loosening state control of public education.  
 
  The formal goals of NCLB are to improve the overall quality of education, to provide 
equality of educational opportunity to all students, and to eliminate group differences in 
educational outcomes. Advocates of NCLB believe its requirements for rigorous curricula, 
teaching, and learning standards and accountability strike the right balance of incentives and 
sanctions (Ali 2004). NCLB’s supporters believe accountability will force states to align course 
content, instruction, and assessment, thereby improving instruction and enhancing learning. The 
law’s advocates maintain that the legislation’s requirements for annual testing and 
disaggregation of scores by subpopulations will reduce the achievement gaps because schools 
will not be able to hide the low achievement of disadvantaged students behind the higher 
achievement of advantaged children. They assert public access to reports will help parents make 
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informed decisions about their children’s education and stimulate greater parental involvement. 
Advocates believe that giving parents information and the right to transfer their child will force 
educators in low performing schools to improve their capacity to educate all children by creating 
a competitive atmosphere where schools must improve to retain students (Chubb and Moe 1990, 
Powers and Cookson 1999).  
 
  Some educators and civil rights advocates supported NCLB because they view it as a 
federal policy that expresses the moral and legal imperative to provide equality of educational 
opportunity to all youth (Ali 2004, Taylor 2003). Senator Edward Kennedy co-sponsored NCLB 
because he believed the transparency of disaggregated test scores would advance the public’s 
demand for equity (Kennedy 2005). The late civil rights attorney William Taylor argued that, if 
properly and fully implemented, NCLB had the potential to empower parents through the 
requirement that school district authorities permit student transfers from low-performing schools 
to better ones irrespective of the latter’s seat capacity or other potential constraints (Taylor 
2003).  
 
  Yet, several weaknesses are endemic to the operation of NCLB. School choice theory 
posits that any of NCLB’s negative consequences are necessary in the short-term to trigger the 
kinds of changes in behavior that result in long-term improvements in low performing schools 
(see Chubb & Moe 1990, Fiske and Ladd 2000, Godwin and Kemerer 2002, Henig 1995, 
McEwan and Carnoy 2000).  
 
 Requiring Schools to Solve Societal Inequality. A general critique of NCLB notes that 
the legislation fails to take into account how the social, political, and economic sources of 
unequal educational achievement that lie beyond school walls affect what goes on within them. 
This point is relevant to schools in rural and central city communities where the material realities 
of daily life make teaching and learning extremely difficult (Anyon 1997, Rebell and Wolff 
2009). 
 
 Accountability Undermines Teacher Quality for the Neediest Students. Schools with 
concentrated poverty tend to have high student mobility rates because poor people are more 
likely to be residentially mobile than other subpopulations. Student mobility and concentrated 
poverty in schools destabilize teacher quality because the best educators tend to transfer to work 
environments where students will meet adequate yearly progress (AYP) (Jackson 2009, 
Lankford, Loeb, and Wyckoff 2002). 
 
  Pedagogy of Drill and Kill. Because assessments of student progress are based on 
annually established (and therefore variable) benchmarks of achievement rather than value-added 
systems that measure improvement, schools whose students show significant progress yet are 
still below proficiency are labeled as failing to meet AYP. To avoid this sanction, low-
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performing schools are pushed to concentrate on test preparation to ensure that students pass 
state standardized tests. This means that in underperforming schools substantial amounts of 
classroom time must be devoted to preparation for math and language tests, rather than to 
learning art, music, science, and social studies in creative ways that engage students and 
stimulate their higher order thinking (Nichols and Berliner 2007, Watanabe 2008).  
 
  Test Preparation Driving the Curriculum. For some observers, test preparation is a 
positive use of instructional time, especially for low-performing students, but skeptics raise the 
issue of what does not get taught while students are preparing for tests (Nichols and Berliner 
2007). Critics point to two aspects of this problem: first, when test preparation drives teaching, 
the curriculum gets narrowed and simplified to only those topics found on the standardized test; 
and second, science, social studies, art, music and other elements of the curriculum are often 
given short shrift during periods when schools focus single-mindedly on test scores (Ravitch 
2010).  
 
  Perpetuating Achievement Gaps by Exposure to Differential Curricula. Critics note 
that in schools that easily make AYP, students are taught science, social studies, art, and music 
because there is less time devoted to test preparation. Moreover, the nature of the pedagogy and 
breadth and depth of curricular coverage to which such students are exposed stimulates higher 
order thinking (Lee 2002). These dynamics contribute to perpetuating the racial, ethnic, and 
social class gaps in outcomes because poor and disadvantaged minority youth are over-
represented in low performing schools where they receive the narrowed curriculum and are 
drilled in test taking skills in lieu of a rich, broad, and engaging curriculum taught through active 
learning activities. 
 
  Opt-out Provisions Exacerbating Concentrations of Low Performing Students. 
NCLB’s opt-out provision is also a source of concern to many observers. According to Taylor 
(2003), a number of factors may prevent parents from transferring their children from low-
performing to high-performing schools and thus limit NCLB’s ultimate utility as a vehicle for 
enhancing equality of educational opportunity and for school improvement. Districts reluctant to 
fully implement transfer policies can limit transfers to certain schools in the district, reduce the 
number of spaces available, delay notification to parents, or provide tepid announcements 
without affirmative outreach to parents of eligible students.  
 
  Given the self-selection mechanisms at work with any choice system, those who opt-out 
may be from more academically-oriented families with higher-achieving students. When the 
better students leave one school for another, the sending school loses funding and parental 
support as well as the better students’ contributions to the school’s positive academic climate. 
Teachers at the sending school may become demoralized and move to another school, thereby 
contributing to staff instability that often plagues low-performing schools. Students who remain 
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in low-performing schools are likely to be less proficient and from lower-income families, 
thereby exacerbating their school’s problems in achieving AYP.  
 
 
Findings about NCLB and Achievement Gaps 
 
 High-stakes tests are nothing if not controversial. McDermott’s (2007) historical case 
study of high-stakes tests suggests that advocates of accountability policies expected high-stakes 
tests to be a fair and efficient way to inspire improvements in both educational equity and 
achievement. However, in all four of the states in McDermott’s study, the results fell short of the 
expectations. As this article will show, North Carolina could serve as the fifth example of the 
failure of accountability to improve outcomes.   
 
On the one hand, accountability policies are flawed in that they demand standard 
outcomes without regard to differences in inputs. On the other hand, the tests themselves are 
problematic in terms of their distortion of educational goals and teaching strategies.  Once high 
stakes consequences are attached to standardized tests, maintaining a valid accountability 
program becomes even more challenging. The principle known popularly as Campbell’s Law 
(Campbell 1979) states that whenever important decisions are based upon the outcomes of some 
quantitative measure, the measure itself becomes corrupted. Indeed, Jones, Jones, and Hargrove 
(2003) found that once states implemented high-stakes testing policies, schools’ curricula shrank, 
teaching practices worsened, motivation suffered, retention increased, teachers became more 
difficult to recruit, and school reputations deteriorated.  
 
 Berliner (2011) argues that outcomes observed above are the unfortunate result of 
completely rational behavior by educators and politicians. High-stakes testing creates incentives 
that reward teachers and administrators for getting high scores and not for developing, inspiring, 
or guiding the student, or even for teaching a broad array of academic skills or knowledge. 
Whether a teacher “teaches to the test” (Perna and Thomas 2009), a principal excludes students 
from the test (Roderick and Engel 2001), or a school engages in outright cheating (Ravitch 
2010), the reasons for doing so are always to game the system by getting student scores that are 
as high as possible (in contrast to scores that are as accurate as possible).  
 
Twenty years of trend lines showing the performance of students on the National 
Assessment of Education Progress (NAEP), the nation’s ‘report card,’ are instructive. Proponents 
of market-inspired reforms anticipated they would improve both educational equity and 
excellence. Although performance among all racial and SES groups shows a slight uptick, a 
review of the gaps in reading and mathematics from 1992 to 2011 shows no change in the size of 
the disparities between the performances of Blacks and Whites, something we could expect to 
see if NCLB were operating to eliminate inequities as advocates expected it would. Importantly, 
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the rate of improvement among all groups is the same before and after the passage of NCLB, 
suggesting that any improvements in performance cannot be attributed to the policy.  
 
One reason for NCLB’s apparent failure to narrow race gaps is that the law does not 
influence the core organizational features of schooling that contribute to the creation of race gaps 
in student performance. A well-known organizational source of gaps is curricular differentiation 
associated with the practice of ability grouping in elementary schools and academic tracking in 
secondary schools. The reason for this dynamic is that the students who receive the worst of the 
narrowed curricula, the weakest pedagogy, “drill and kill” lessons, and limited learning 
opportunities are those in lower-track classes. A growing body of research indicates that such 
students have long gotten the short end of the academic stick (Lucas 1999, Mickelson and Everitt 
2003, Oakes 2005). New research indicates the introduction of high-stakes tests has exacerbated 
the problem. For example, in her case study of North Carolina schools, Watanabe (2008) 
observed that the very same teachers spent, on average, nearly 50% of their class time on test 
preparation in the lower track classes but only 15% of their class time on test preparation in their 
upper-level classes. What were the honors students doing while other students practiced multiple 
choice questions? They were doing speeches, debates, reports, creative writing, and other 
activities that include the higher-order thinking skills that are important to the quality of 
education. High-stakes tests, it would seem, have become one more mechanism by which 
schools provide unequal opportunities to learn.  
 
 
The Present Study:  Testing and the Race Gap in North Carolina, 1998-2004 
 Several state governments instituted standards and accountability reforms for K-12 and 
higher education years before NCLB required all states receiving federal aid to do so. Under the 
leadership of former Governor Jim Hunt, North Carolina became one of the first of these early 
states (Heubert and Hauser 1999). The centerpiece of North Carolina’s own public education 
restructuring efforts is its 1996 school-based management and accountability program known as 
the New ABCs of Public Education framework (NCDPI 2011). ABC stands for accountability 
and high standards, the basics, and local control. In fact, many of NCLB’s standards-based 
reforms are foreshadowed in North Carolina’s reforms (Mickelson, Smith, and Southworth 
2007). 
 
 Between 1995 and 1998 the state implemented the ABCs program in every public 
school from kindergarten to 12
th
 grade. The program continues to evolve, but the use of 
standardized test results to evaluate, reward, and punish students and schools has been a part of 
the ABCs from the mid-1990s. The ABC framework established growth and performance 
standards beginning in 1996. Students in grades 3 through 8 are assessed by annual End-of-
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Grade (EOG) tests in reading, mathematics, and writing. High school students graduating in 
2004 were tested in one English course, two social studies courses, three math courses, and four  
science courses.
1
 High school assessments are called End-of-Course (EOC) tests. EOG and EOC 
tests are aligned with the state’s curricular standards in the tested subjects.  
 
 Schools with students who meet growth standards are rewarded with accolades from 
the state and monetary bonuses for their staff. Schools failing to meet growth and performance 
standards receive help from assistance teams sent by the North Carolina’s Department of Public 
Instruction (NCDPI). Ultimately, schools that do not improve will be taken over by the state. 
School results are sent home for parents, and school by school ABC results are reported to the 
public in A Report Card for the ABCs of Public Education made available on the NCDPI’s 
website. After two consecutive years of low performances, the ABC Framework permits parents 
to transfer their children to a high-performing school from their low-performing school (Mintrop 
and Trujillo 2005).  
 
 Following the passage of NCLB in 2002, several components of the ABC Plan were 
modified or added to conform to the federal law (NCDPI 2011). The two assessments and 
standards programs remain complementary but not identical. For instance, the ABC rating can 
conflict with NCLB labels. Elementary and middle school EOG tests in reading and mathematics 
are used for both NCLB and ABCs rating, but results are calculated differently. NCLB looks at 
performance at the school level disaggregated by group; the ABC Plan assesses school wide 
performance averages in addition to growth scores. Therefore, it is possible for a school to meet 
its ABC goals but fail to make AYP according to NCLB’s standards (Helms 2004).
2
  
 
 
Research Questions 
 
Given the stated objective of NCLB (and the ABCs program) to close achievement gaps 
and the various reasons for skepticism about its ability to do so, we pose three research 
questions. First, do North Carolina students’ scores on high-stakes tests indicate gaps in 
achievement associated with race or class? Ample evidence suggests a long history of 
racial/ethnic minority students and low-SES students, on average, earning lower scores on state 
tests than their White and high-SES counterparts, respectively. Second, if those gaps exist, do 
those gaps shrink as a cohort of North Carolina students progresses through school? If 
accountability policies are having the desired outcome, we should see that the gaps between 
                                                          
1
 In the 2012-2013 school year, North Carolina cut back its EOC tests to one science, one math, and one English 
course. 
2  Discrepancies between state and NCLB proficiency results occur elsewhere across the nation (Hornbeck 2013, Linn 
2005, Pinzur 2003).  
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Black and White and between rich and poor shrink as the pressure on educators to meet 
standards inspires them to change their behavior to boost the achievement of chronically under-
performing groups. Third, if gaps persist or increase as a North Carolina cohort moves through 
school, does a difference in opportunities to learn explain that difference? The third question 
raises the issue of “why”— that is, what are the likely mechanisms that contribute to the failure 
of the current approach, as reflected in the NCLB and ABCs programs, to improve learning 
outcomes for all children and to closing the achievement gap. Decades of research suggest a 
multiplicity of individual, family, and school factors are responsible for the persistence of the 
racial achievement gap. In this study, we examine the contribution of one aspect of the 
organization of teaching and learning: academic tracking. A well-established line of research has 
shown the experiences of students in higher-level and lower-level academic tracks are quite 
different, with honors classes engaging in higher-order thinking activities such as synthesis and 
evaluation and lower tracks focusing on individual seat work and memorization. A growing body 
of scholarship finds that NCLB may be exacerbating that difference, with lower track classes 
also emphasizing basic test preparation lessons at the expense of richer curricular and 
instructional activities involving higher-order thinking (Dorn 2010, Giersch 2012, Nichols and 
Berliner 2010, Watanabe 2008). 
 
Design of the Study 
 
 We answer these questions using a longitudinal dataset from North Carolina. North 
Carolina data are an excellent source for examining the questions that this study investigates. 
First, North Carolina employed curriculum standards and standardized tests for several years 
prior to the implementation of NCLB in 2002. This means the available data offer a six-year 
window from 1998 through 2004 during which the essential dynamic of standards and 
accountability through high stakes testing was operating. Second, North Carolina resembles the 
United States in terms of student achievement, student-teacher ratio, and education expenditure. 
In 2004, North Carolina also resembled the United States in terms of racial diversity and SES. In 
2005, North Carolina was 68% White while the United States was 67% White.
3
 In the same year, 
13% of North Carolina residents lived in poverty, matching the rate for the United States overall 
(Hovey and Hovey 2007). These similarities make North Carolina’s population useful in drawing 
conclusions that may be suggestive of national trends.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
3
 While the majority population in North Carolina resembles the United States, the minority population is 
disproportionally black. Although the Latino/a population of North Carolina is growing rapidly, in 1998 the baseline 
year for data used in this study the number of Latino/a students was relatively small.  
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Sample 
 
The sample used for this research includes North Carolina’s entire 2004 high school 
graduating class (more than 76,000 students). This was one of the state’s first cohorts of students 
to take high-stakes tests in both middle and high school. Our data include students’ test scores, 
academic tracks, and family background information as well as data about the schools they 
attended from middle school through high school. These data are part of the North Carolina 
Roots of STEM dataset.
4
 The Roots of STEM project seeks to understand what factors increase 
the likelihood that women and minorities will declare and complete majors in the science, 
technology, engineering, or math (STEM) disciplines. This study is part of that larger project.   
 
The analysis in this study focuses on student-level variables, but the statistical models 
control for the effects of high schools to account for variance that may be associated with 
attendance at a particular high school (Laird and Ware 1982). This approach is important 
because if we do not control for the effects of different high schools on student test scores, we 
cannot accurately assess the influence of student characteristics on achievement. Table 1 
provides an overview of the student-level variables. Most measures we employ are 
conventionally found in social science research about educational outcomes, but a few constructs 
deserve some explanation.  
 
We wanted to capture two aspects of socioeconomic status (SES), both parent education 
and income. The link between parent education (a variable included in the dataset) and SES is 
fairly well established in the literature (Davis-Kean 2005, Lareau 2003, Magnuson 2007). The 
Roots of STEM data also included a variable for participation in the federal Free and Reduced 
Lunch (FRL) program while in middle school.
5
 While FRL is far from a perfect indicator of SES, 
it remains widely used in education research (Harwell and LeBeau 2010). For this reason we 
used these two measures to create a low-SES variable that is coded 1 for any student who 
received free or reduced lunch in middle school or had parents without high school diplomas.  
  
                                                          
4
 This article utilizes the unique Roots of STEM dataset (http://clas-pages.uncc.edu/rootsofstem/blog/tag/roots-of-
stem/) that includes indicators of individual, family, community characteristics, and  secondary school and college 
experiences among the population of 2004 high school graduates from the state of North Carolina (NC) who entered 
one of the 16 campuses of the University of North Carolina system.  This article is drawn from Jason Giersch's 
doctoral dissertation, "Standardized Distraction: Why the Emphasis on High-Stakes Testing Can't Resolve 
Educational Inequality" (2012). 
5
 Our data do not include information about free or reduced lunch in high school.  
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Table 1. Core concepts, variable names, and the operationalization of variables.  
Core Terms Variable Operationalization 
High School 
Achievement 
EOC Scores 
Mean score of student’s required EOC tests (algebra I, 
geometry, algebra II, ELP, US history, English I, biology)  
Opportunities 
to Learn 
Track 
Placement 
Proportion of EOC courses taken as honors, AP, or IB  
Middle School 
Achievement 
EOG Scores Mean scale scores for math and reading EOGs 
Student 
Background 
Race Dummy variables for each 
Sex Dummy variable in which male=1 
Low SES 
Dummy variable in which 1 indicates either free/reduced 
lunch while in middle school or parents did not graduate 
high school 
Limited 
English Ability 
Dummy variable in which 1= limited English skills 
 
 The dependent variables in this study are measures of mean EOC scores and mean EOG 
scores. Although North Carolina’s requirements for EOC tests are always in flux, at the time of 
this cohort’s high school education students in the Core curriculum were required to take high-
stakes tests in Algebra I, Geometry, Algebra II, ELP
 
(Economics, Law, and Politics), U.S. 
History, English I, and Biology. Middle school students took reading comprehension and 
mathematics EOG tests in both 7
th
 and 8
th
 grades. All of these tests follow a multiple choice 
format. North Carolina’s Department of Public Instruction converts each student’s raw score into 
a scale score that can be compared to the student’s scale score on the same exam in previous (and 
later) years. Scale scores are reported to parents, along with a percentile rank score and an 
achievement level, the latter of which fits into one of four pre-determined performance 
benchmarks. Each item on the EOG and EOC tests is directly tied to the goals found in the state 
standards. For example, Goal 5 of North Carolina’s 8
th
 grade language arts curriculum is for 
students to “use interpretive and evaluative processes to analyze texts and their characteristics” 
(NCDPI 2012). On the EOG, students needed to read a passage from “The Final Memo,” a short 
story by Paul Stewart, and answer five multiple choice questions about characters, their 
personalities, and word usage in the reading.  
 
To create the mean EOG variable, we averaged students’ reading and math EOG scores. 
To create the mean EOC variable, we averaged students’ required EOC test scores, including 
Algebra 1, Geometry, Algebra 2, English 1, ELP, U.S. History, and Biology. Table 4 shows that 
the EOG math and reading scores are scaled to similar means, ranges, and standard deviations. 
Likewise, the EOC tests are scaled to similar means, ranges, and standard deviations.    
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 The EOC data also offer ways to identify students’ academic tracks. All EOC courses 
have an indicator of course level. From these variables we created a proportion honors classes 
variable by taking the number of EOC-tested honors-, AP-, or IB-level EOC courses a student 
had taken among and dividing it by the total number of EOC courses they had taken. Although 
this method only incorporates a small portion of the high school career, it covers multiple 
disciplines and the most important courses, if only because accountability policies give them 
such importance. The role of high-stakes tests also makes this variable a conservative estimate of 
the effects of tracking generally. Because they are state-tested, these courses are especially tied 
to the core curriculum, so any differences we see as a result of tracking are probably tied to 
differences in how they are taught and not due to differences in content. 
 
Table 2. Descriptive summaries for middle and high school analyses. 
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Dependent Variables      
Mean EOG score 70,710 166.609 8.316 133.5 191 
Mean EOC score 70,710 57.948 8.310 21 87.0 
Independent Variables      
Male 70,710 0.489 0.500 0 1 
White 70,710 0.666 0.472 0 1 
Black 70,710 0.270 0.444 0 1 
Hispanic 70,710 0.020 0.141 0 1 
Asian 70,710 0.018 0.132 0 1 
American Indian 70,710 0.016 0.124 0 1 
Other race 70,710 0.000 0.018 0 1 
Low SES 70,710 0.323 0.467 0 1 
Proportion honors classes 70,710 0.220 0.310 0 1 
 
Analytic Steps 
 
 The analyses follow tens of thousands of individual North Carolina students through 
middle school and high school. We use several multilevel models that test the effects of student 
background and prior achievement on academic performance while controlling for the effects of 
track placement during high schools. These models allow the effects of individual characteristics 
to be separated from the effects of schools. We employ the software package Stata (Rabe-
Hesketh and Skrondal 2012) and its xtmixed procedure to run multilevel regression models. To 
account for possible collinearity problems in the analysis, we centered the variables by their 
grand means by subtracting the mean value of the observations in the analytic sample from each 
observation.  
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Results 
 
The first question of this study asks if students from minority and low-SES families score 
lower than those from White and more prosperous backgrounds. Table 3 addresses this question 
in terms of high-stakes test scores through the results of multilevel regression models predicting 
mean EOG and EOC scale scores only by student background factors. Students are clustered by 
high school to account for school effects. Both models show that low-SES students score, on 
average, about 3.5 scale-score points lower than other students on both the seventh grade EOG 
tests and high school EOC tests. Males score lower than females by about a half-point (-.522***) 
in middle school and a third of a point (-.332***) in high school. Whites (the reference category 
for race) tend to score higher than Blacks in middle school (-5.165***) and high school              
(-4.462***), Hispanics in middle school (-.616***), and American Indian students in middle 
school (-3.395***) and high school (-3.279***), but lower than Asian students in middle school 
(1.486***) and high school (2.901***). None of the results is unexpected given prior research on 
the race gaps in performance. The gap is widest between Blacks and Asians. The performance of 
Asians and Hispanics is higher, relative to other groups, on the high school tests than on the 
middle school tests. One explanation for their improved performance could be the substantial 
number of immigrants within those groups who learn English as they progress through the 
grades. Although the limited English variable accounts for those students who qualified for 
language services, becoming acclimated to America’s culture and public schools likely accounts 
for some of the improvement among Asians and Hispanics. Overall, the relationships between 
student background and middle school tests (model 1) are similar to those between student 
background and high school tests (model 2). These results suggest that achievement gaps were 
fairly static for this cohort between middle and high school.  
 
Table 4 uses middle school test scores as a predictor variable for high school scores. 
Logically, a student who does well in middle school will also do well in high school. The first 
model in Table 4 confirms that this is true. For each point improvement a student made above 
average on the middle school EOG tests, he or she could expect an additional eight tenths of a 
point (.806***) on the high school EOC tests. Model 2 adds the student background variables to 
that model. The coefficient for the EOG tests becomes slightly smaller as a result (.787***), 
confirming that background indeed plays a role in a student’s continued success from middle 
school into high school. Relative to females, males’ scores, on average, improve nearly a tenth of 
a point as they transition from middle to high school. Relative to Whites, Blacks (-.411***) and 
Native Americans (-.618***) do worse while Asians (1.806***) and Hispanics (.397***) do 
better. Students who are low-SES show a lower average high school test score compared to their 
counterparts and controlling for middle school achievement.  
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Table 3. Student Characteristics and the Prediction of EOG and EOC Test Scores. 
 Model 1: Predicting 
EOG scores 
 Model 2: Predicting 
EOC scores 
 Estimate S.E.  Estimate S.E. 
Low SES   -3.543*** 0.066    -3.439*** 0.065 
Male   -0.522*** 0.054    -0.332*** 0.052 
Black   -5.165*** 0.072    -4.462*** 0.070 
American Indian   -3.395*** 0.240    -3.279*** 0.234 
Hispanic   -0.616** 0.210    -0.087 0.204 
Asian    1.486*** 0.213     2.901*** 0.207 
Other race    2.002 1.452     3.052* 1.413 
Limited English   -6.381*** 0.290    -4.644*** 0.282 
Constant  170.265*** 0.184    62.264*** 0.200 
Log-likelihood -239283.0   -237368.1  
N 70710   70710  
* significant at .05 
** significant at .01 
*** significant at .001 
 
Table 4. Student Characteristics, Prior Achievement, and Tracking EOG and the Prediction of 
EOC Test Scores. 
 Model 1 Model 2  Model 3 
 Estimate S.E. Estimate S.E. Estimate S.E. 
Mean EOG score .806*** .002 .787*** .002 .716*** .002 
Male   .087** .031 .194*** .030 
Black   -.411*** .043 -.483*** .042 
American Indian   -.618*** .122 -.699*** .135 
Asian   1.744*** .122 1.473*** .120 
Hispanic   .397*** .043 .402*** .118 
Other race   1.470 .834 1.453 .815 
Limited English   .369* .167 .270 .163 
Low SES   -.666*** .039 -.509*** .038 
Proportion of classes taken 
as honors classes 
    
3.632*** .062 
Constant 58.23*** .089 58.267*** .085 58.033*** .080 
Log-likelihood -200462  -200049  -198355  
N 70710  70710  70710  
* significant at .05 
** significant at .01 
*** significant at .001 
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 Model 3 adds one more variable to the mix: academic track. The result is a small decline 
in the effect of previous achievement (from .787*** to .716***). Although the academic track 
variable has a mean, variance, and range that is quite similar to the other background variables, 
its coefficient is much larger than the others, attesting to the academic benefits of enrolling in 
upper-level class. In this model, an honors-track student will outscore a non-honors track student 
by more than three points (3.632***), even when middle school test scores, race, and SES are all 
held to their means. This suggests that students in honors tracks learn more than their otherwise 
comparable peers in lower tracks. 
 
 Accounting for academic track, however, does not explain away differences associated 
with race and SES. In fact, when academic track is held to the mean, the negative effects of 
being Black (-.483***) or Hispanic (-.699***) become slightly stronger. The gain that boys 
(.194***) make on girls between middle and high school tests also becomes stronger when track 
is held constant. A VIF test confirmed that these results were not corrupted by multicollinearity. 
 
 Three important findings come from these results. First, we have confirmed that student 
background continues to play a statistically significant role in the performance of students on 
high-stakes tests, both in middle school and in high school. Second, we find that while on the 
path from middle school test scores to high school test scores, students will follow a slightly 
different trajectory depending on their gender, race, and SES. Third, while academic track does 
not account for the differences associated with student background, it does play a significant role 
in standardized test scores, and thus deserves more attention than it often receives.  
 
Enrolling in honors classes clearly has benefits for student outcomes, and while such 
higher track classes are in theory open to all students, not all students enroll in them. We now 
investigate what roles student background and middle school test scores play in high school track 
placements. The answer to this question is critical to narrowing the race gap in achievement 
because prior research suggests that test scores are used for placement decisions.  
 
Our findings in this study offer further evidence that high-stakes test results in middle 
school lead to the sorting of students by race and SES into different academic tracks. Table 5 
addresses this issue first with a model that predicts proportion of honors classes using student 
background data. Model 1 shows that males (-.040***) take fewer honors classes than females, 
Blacks (-.080***) and American Indians (-.044***) take fewer honors classes than Whites who 
take fewer than Asians (.103***). Students of low socio-economic status (-.111***) take fewer 
honors classes than their counterparts. Model 2 adds middle school EOG test performance to the 
equation. Not surprisingly, doing well on the high-stakes test (.019***) is associated with taking 
more honors classes in high school. And while the background variables that were statistically 
significant in the first model retain their signs and significance in the second model, their 
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coefficients each lose magnitude. By simply controlling for middle school test scores, more than 
75% of the effects of being Black on taking honors classes are accounted for, half of the effect of 
being American Indian is accounted for, a quarter of the effect of being Asian is accounted for, 
and nearly two-thirds of the effect of being low-SES is accounted for. In other words, the 
segregation of students by race and SES into different high school tracks is in no small part 
associated with their scores on middle school high-stakes tests. Given the significant effect of 
track placement on high school test scores, and the role of EOG tests in high school track 
placements, the analyses reveal at least one way that NCLB’s mandate for standardized testing 
contributes to the persistence of the race gaps in achievement.  
 
Table 5. Student Characteristics, Middle School Prior Achievement, and the Prediction of 
High School Track Placement. 
 Model 1  Model 2  
 Estimate S.E.  Estimate S.E. 
Male      -.040*** .002     -.030** .002 
Black      -.080*** .003       -.019*** .003 
American Indian      -.044*** .009     -.022** .008 
Asian        .103*** .008        .074*** .007 
Hispanic -.015 .008   .003 .007 
Other race   .038 .057  -.000 .049 
Limited English       -.094*** .011       .029** .010 
Low SES       -.111*** .003        -.043*** .002 
Mean EOG score           .019*** .000 
Constant        .363*** .011         .267*** .009 
Log-likelihood -10,207   -454  
N 70,710   70,710  
* significant at .05 
** significant at .01 
*** significant at .001 
Discussion 
 
No Child Left Behind mandates standards, testing, and accountability to improve student 
outcomes and narrow race and SES gaps in achievement. Based on market theories, the explicit 
theory of change advanced by the designers of high stakes tests is that sanctions and incentives 
will alter educators’ behaviors in ways that boost performance among previously low-achieving 
students. This expectation hinges upon the presumption that without high-stakes tests the low-
achieving students and their teachers simply did not have enough motivation to learn or teach.  
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 The findings of this study offer no evidence that NCLB’s theory of reform has been 
successful in North Carolina.
6
 In fact, we offer ample evidence to make the opposite case. Our 
findings show that not only did testing not close the race gaps, but also to the extent that middle 
school standardized test scores were part of the practice of assigning students to high school 
tracks, they contributed to maintaining them. Even controlling for other factors, students’ EOG 
standardized test scores influenced their high school track placements. Those who did well on 
their middle school EOG test were more likely to be placed in higher tracks for the rest of their 
high school careers. As a result of widespread tracking in North Carolina, males, Blacks, and 
low-income youth are much less likely to learn in college prep tracks than otherwise comparable 
females, Whites, and Asian youth. Not surprisingly, the findings show that students in higher 
tracks score better on their EOC tests, therein reflecting one of the organizational mechanisms 
that contribute to the perpetuation of the notorious race gaps.  
 
Our findings show the high-stakes accountability policy in place in North Carolina has 
not closed the achievement gaps. Using the policy’s own measures of achievement, we find that 
in making the transition from middle school to high school, Asians extend their academic lead 
over White students, and Hispanics get slightly closer to the average score of Whites. Blacks and 
Native Americans, however, see their gap with White and Asian peers grow larger. The gap 
associated with SES also increases. Boys, while scoring lower than girls in both middle and high 
school, do close the gap slightly in high school, although it is also likely that the weakest 
students have dropped out (Stearns and Glennie 2006). 
 
 The fact that lower-track, Black, Native American, and low-SES students all did worse 
on their high school tests than their middle school tests is cause for alarm. Of even greater 
concern is the fact that these gaps in achievement are apparent on the very instruments that their 
teachers and schools have been focusing on for weeks as they prepared for exams. If 
disadvantaged students are falling behind on these measures, students whose daily classwork 
heavily emphasized test preparation, one can only imagine on what other areas of learning these 
students are being left even further behind.  
 
 Finally, the effects of high-stakes tests on academic tracking cannot be ignored. If test 
scores are being used to sort students into academic tracks and different tracks offer different 
opportunities to learn, then high-stakes tests are assisting in the stratification and segregation of 
opportunities to learn within schools, not fostering the equity advocates of NCLB promised. This 
                                                          
6
  Lauen and Gaddis (2013) examined test scores for multiple cohorts of North Carolina 3
rd
 through 8
th
 graders from 
2002 to 2009 to assess NCLB’s effects on closing SES gaps in outcomes. They report NCLB lead to a reduction in 
the SES achievement gap. They find that poor students benefit from NCLB subgroup-specific accountability 
pressure, while non-poor students suffer no significant adverse effects. The disparities in findings between this 
article and their findings may be due to the different age of their sample (elementary through middle school while 
we examined middle school through high school outcomes), the different outcome variable (EOG compared to our 
EOC score), the specific gap they examined (SES compared to our examination of race gap), and the later years of 
their study (2002 to 2009 compared to our 1998 through 2006 window). 
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pattern is particularly bothersome in light of the fact that standardized tests are poor instruments 
for measuring higher-order thinking skills, which honors classes tend to emphasize. 
 
Limitations 
 
As with all research, there are several limitations to this study. One is its use of high-
stakes tests to assess the academic progress of students. For reasons outlined in the beginning of 
this article, standardized test scores are limited in their usefulness, and attaching any high stakes 
to them as we have done in using them to assess NCLB’s role in the race gap’s persistence is 
potentially problematic. We employ them in this study for other reasons. One is that the data are 
readily available in this form and for better or worse, standardized tests remain the ‘coin of the 
realm.’  The other reason is their importance to the prevailing education policies under US and 
NC law. Whether they actually measure student learning in a rigorous and complete manner, 
EOGs and EOCs are being used as though they do, and as such the scores are being used to 
calculate grades, assess progress, compare performance, and evaluate teachers and students. 
Because of the importance attached to these test scores, we feel it is important to understand the 
factors that influence them.  
 
The second limitation to this study is its reliance on statistical calculations from 
administrative data rather than qualitative investigations that capture and describe the 
mechanisms that influence student achievement on tests or their selection into academic tracks. 
Past research tells us that student performance influences decisions about tracking and that 
tracking in turn influences student performance, but we have not conducted the extensive 
interviews or observations that would be required to strengthen or explicate the argument. 
Nonetheless, we are confident that EOGs contribute heavily to high school track placements and 
that track plays a role in EOC scores.  
 
Conclusion  
 
Market-inspired school reforms including NCLB have been implemented in North 
Carolina for almost two decades in order to attain greater equity and excellence in public school 
outcomes. If North Carolina is any indication of national trends, NCLB will not be the policy 
solution that raises the performance of chronically low-performing groups. NCLB does not 
introduce any new pedagogical techniques to educators; rather than adding resources, it 
threatened to take them away in low performing schools, along with sanctions on administrators 
and district authorities. Its fundamental premise is that low achievers have been capable of 
performing at the same level as their peers, but they lacked sufficient incentive to do so, or at 
least their teachers lacked sufficient motivation to teach them well. Differences in resources, 
neighborhoods, communities, and social contexts are irrelevant to the NCLB strategy; the 
emphasis is on getting every single student to “proficiency” on standardized tests. Whether 
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proficiency on standardized tests is a worthwhile goal is a long discussion best left for another 
time. 
 
 After NCLB’s implementation, all states and the District of Columbia created standards-
based, high-stakes tests to be administered to students annually. Each year, states roll out more 
tests on more subjects. Results are publicized and schools, districts, and in some cases even 
teachers are judged, both formally and informally, on the outcomes. As predicted, educators 
scramble to find new, and in many cases illegal, ways to boost scores. Witness the high profile 
school districts faced with cheating scandals: Houston, Atlanta, and Washington, DC, for 
example. The scores on high-stakes tests increased in many states, but increased dropout rates 
and stagnant NAEP scores often accompanied those increases. The frequent mismatch between 
proficiency levels on a state’s NAEP scores and proficiency levels on state standards is 
emblematic of the perversity of using standardized test scores as measures of learning. 
 
This study corroborates the findings of other studies of inequalities associated with 
accountability policies in North Carolina (Watanabe 2008), Texas (Valenzuela 2005), and 
elsewhere (Nichols and Berliner 2007, Perna and Thomas 2009, Ravitch 2010) and provides new 
information about the drawbacks to NCLB. The findings show that race and SES gaps in student 
test scores remain, that the gaps do not substantially shrink as students progress through 
secondary school, and that the organization of teaching and learning in secondary schools—
academic tracking—contributes to the failure of standards-based reforms to foster either 
educational equity or excellence in North Carolina. 
 
  Rather than contribute to achieving the twin goals of educational excellence and equity, 
our study suggests NCLB’s focus on standardized testing and accountability harms the learning 
and teaching process. It narrows curricula and distorts teaching especially for low-performing 
students. Perhaps the most serious consequence of NCLB’s theory of reform is that it ignores and 
obscures other school-based sources of inequality that include race and SES-linked access to 
teacher quality, continued segregation of schools along lines of race and class, ability grouping 
and curricular tracking, and resource inequality among the schools. Furthermore, NCLB’s 
premise that claims competition increases performance is one that has no scientific warrant in the 
hundreds of empirical studies on the topic.  
 
In contrast to theory, this study’s empirical findings are relevant to reauthorization of No 
Child Left Behind. They reveal some of the problems inherent in an education system driven by 
competition. The first is that competition doesn’t change anything. Bad teachers are still bad 
teachers. Poor schools are still poor schools. And students who are labeled as less capable are 
placed in classes with lower expectations, fewer learning opportunities, and diminished hopes for 
future success. While a standardized test may sound meritocratic and objective, the field on 
which the competition is held is far from level. Second, competition shifts the emphasis of 
19
Mickelson et al.: How (and Why) NCLB Failed to Close the Achievement Gap
Produced by The Earl Carl Institute for Legal and Social Policy, Inc., Spring 2011
 
education away from authentic assessments of student growth, learning, and development and 
shifts it to a score on a multiple-choice test. For some students and schools, it is easy to score 
well on a test while also engaging in all the academic pursuits that will prepare someone for 
further education and a career. For other students, merely passing the exam requires that they 
engage in repetitive, lower-order mental tasks in a seemingly endless preparation and testing 
cycle.  
 
The final, and perhaps most important, concern is how we treat the winners and losers of 
the competition. NCLB rewards winners and punishes losers at each stage of education. If 
students are being told beginning in elementary school that their abilities, their teachers, and their 
schools are below average, how should we expect them to respond?  Under the guiding 
assumptions of NCLB, those students will be driven by the desire to have a better score next 
time, and if they fail in middle school they will try even harder in high school. Meanwhile, their 
best teachers have moved on to greener pastures, where students are likely to make “proficiency” 
and salaries are more competitive. Their parents have lowered their expectations. Their schools 
have seen their reputations drop along with nearby property values as families who have the 
means to do so flee to districts and schools with higher scores. And based on the results of this 
study, it is a safe bet that the child who does poorly in the early years will continue to do so in 
the later years.  
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